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Abstract: The paper examines the interactions between economic integration and popu-
lation agglomeration in a middle product economy displaying neoclassical growth. There
are two vertically integrated economies. Each consists of a large number of ﬁnal good com-
petitive ﬁrms operating plants in both regions, and a large number of intermediate goods
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms operating each in only one region. While immobile work-
ers are employed with intermediate goods to produce the ﬁnal good, mobile workers are used
to design the line of diﬀerentiated intermediate-good inputs. Capital is immobile, the ﬁnal
good is non-traded, whereas the intermediate goods are traded. We ﬁnd that employment
agglomeration and output growth need not be positively related. Furthermore, trade is not
necessarily beneﬁcial to regional growth, whereas trade between the two regions need not be
associated with a widened skilled-unskilled wage gap. (JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers:D 9 0 ,
F15, O41, R13)
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Contemporary research focussing on the relationships between growth, trade and the location
of economic activity looks like a patchwork of results that cannot be generally reconciled
w i t hd a t a .W h e r e a st h e r ei sal a r g ea g r e e m e n ta m o n ge c o n o m i s t sa b o u tt h ep o s i t i v er o l eo f
international trade in fostering long-run economic growth, empirical studies fail to identify a
robust and signiﬁcant relation between the two processes (Levin and Renelt [30]; Frankel and
Romer [15]). Likewise, it is now a well-documented fact that, over the past two decades, wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled groups (skill premium) has increased sharply, in both
developed and developing countries.1 During this period, imports of low skill-intensive goods
from less-developed economies have increased sharply (Sachs and Shatz [35]). Much concern
has, therefore, been raised regarding the impact of trade on between-group income disparities
(Leamer [27]; Wood [42]; Lawrence and Slaughter [26]), while recent empirical evidence shows
that deeper economic integration has an ambiguous impact on regional income gaps (Magrini
[31]).2 Last, a common ﬁnding in modern regional growth is that population agglomeration
and output growth are positively related when economies are suﬃciently integrated (Baldwin
1See, for example, the comprehensive survey by Levy and Murnane [29]. In particular, Juhn, Murphy
and Topel [23] ﬁnd that the real wage for the lowest 20% of the American workforce in the 1990s was 25%
below the 1973 level. Over the period from 1963 to 1989, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [22] indicate that the real
wage for the least skilled American workers (tenth percentile) decreased by 5% whereas the real wage of the
most skilled (ninetieth percentile) rose by 40%. Similar trends have been found in Canada and Great Britain
(Katz, Loveman and Blanchﬂower [24]; Beaudry and Green [6]), as well as in Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan and
Thailand (Tsou [38]; Bourguignon and Goh [10]) as well as in Chile and Mexico (Beyer, Rojas and Vergara
[8]; Legovini, Bouillon and Lustig [28]).
2For example, Leamer [27] and Wood [42] claim that the expansion of trade with less-developed countries
widens the skill premium, whereas Lawrence and Slaughter [26] and Harrigan [18] counter this conclusion by
documenting empirically that trade is not a major factor driving the wage inequality in advanced economies.
Compelling arguments suggest that possible major forces for the recent trend in wage disparities include
advancements in the skill-biased technology that widens the wage premium (Autor, Katz and Krueger [2])
and improvements in the general purpose technology that induces within-the-skill-group wage inequality
(Acemoglu [1]).
1and Martin [3]). Here also, such a positive relation cannot be identiﬁed empirically in a robust
fashion (Berliant and Wang [7]). All of these suggest the existence of a strong tension between
diverging economic forces that have not yet been captured within a uniﬁed framework. Our
purpose is to contribute to the building of such a framework by tackling the problem from a
very diﬀerent angle.
In this respect, we want to stress the fact that most of the literature dealing with the
implications of economic integration has been conducted by focussing on the ﬁnal product
market. However, since the seminal work of Sanyal and Jones [36], it has been increasingly
recognized that “the bulk of international trade consists of the exchange of intermediate
products, raw materials, and goods which require further local processing before reaching
the ﬁnal consumer” (page 16). More precisely, almost all contemporary ﬁnal commodities
make use of inputs bought on the world markets together with inputs available in national
markets. This state of aﬀairs has triggered more and more interest in what is called the middle
product market.3 In such a context, economic integration takes the special form of vertically
integrated regions that trade a growing number as well as larger quantities of intermediate
inputs from each other. The empirical relevance of this form of trade in international business
is well documented and explains why we focus on it. For example, Yi ([44] page 55) observes
that “vertical specialization [integration] has grown about 30 percent and accounts for about
one-third of the growth in trade in the last 20-30 years”.
This paper examines the interactions between trade and population agglomeration in
a neoclassical growth model with two vertically integrated economies in the presence of
intermediate goods.4 Its primary goal is to shed light on three still-open issues: (i) whether
employment agglomeration and output growth are necessary positively related in a vertically
integrated economy, (ii) whether trade in intermediate goods is always beneﬁcial to economic
growth, and (iii) whether intermediate goods trade widen skilled-unskilled wage diﬀerential
3See the survey paper by Jones and Neary ([21] Section 3.1) and the papers cited therein.
4While we focus on a stationary equilibrium with transitional output growth, the model can be easily
extended to allow for exogenous technical progress in the ﬁnal good sector and hence exogenous long-trun
growth.
2when skilled workers are mobile. As will be seen, our model enable us to address those
issues by studying the intermediate goods demand and supply as well as their pricing and
interregional allocation. We then characterize the steady-state equilibrium by examining how
employment agglomeration, capital accumulation and output growth respond to changes in
the unit transport cost and the designing eﬃciency of the production process.
Speciﬁcally, our economy involves two regions (countries or regional blocks). Each consists
of a large number of ﬁnal good competitive ﬁrms operating plants in both regions, and a
large number of intermediate goods monopolistically competitive ﬁrms operating each in
only one region. In addition, each region has a large number of unskilled-immobile and
of skilled-mobile workers. The main features of our framework are as follows: (i) whereas
immobile-unskilled workers are employed with intermediate goods to produce the ﬁnal good,
mobile-skilled workers are used to design the production line that captures the diversity of
diﬀerentiated intermediate-good inputs in producing the ﬁnal good; (ii) capital is immobile,
as in the conventional international trade literature; (iii) the ﬁnal good is a nontradeable
whereas the intermediate goods are traded, as in the middle product model; (iv) but, unlike
the middle product model, we allow for imperfect competition with costly shipping as well
as endogenous capital accumulation within an intertemporal optimizing setting.
The assumption that both capital and the ﬁnal product are nontradeables is made here
b e c a u s eo u rm a i nf o c u si so ni n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d st r a d e .I td o e sn o ta ﬀect the nature of our
analysis but vastly simpliﬁes the analysis. The assumption of immobile capital is common to
the Hecksher-Ohlin model of international trade (Jones [19] pp. 14-16; Krugman and Obstfeld
[3] pp. 40-41) and appear to be less restrictive if we focus on structure capital and putty-clay
equipment capital — the latter is particularly relevant if one considers that, in practice, many
equipment capitals are installed with adjustments to the local environment (such as local
language, speciﬁc operational procedures, environmental regulations, etc.). Furthermore, in
a highly cited work, Feldstein and Horioka [14] argue that capital mobility across countries
was low in the 1960s and 1970s, and was not increasing over time.5 Finally, assuming that
5The Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis is based on the empirical evidence that there is a strong correlation
3the ﬁnal product is a nontradeable allows us to separate the eﬀects of middle-product trade
on agglomeration, growth and wage inequality. Such an approach is fairly standard in the
literature devoted to the international fragmentation of production, as in Venables [15] and
Jones [20].
The most distinctive feature of our model lies in the dynamic analysis of the middle prod-
uct market, which allows us to shed new light on the issues mentioned above. In this respect,
our main ﬁndings may be summarized as follows. Regarding the three questions raised in
the foregoing, we ﬁrst show that employment agglomeration and output growth need not be
positively related, thus explaining why a positive and robust relation cannot be identiﬁed em-
pirically. As for the last two questions, our model suggests that trade in intermediate goods
does not always beneﬁtg r o w t h , whereas it need not widen skilled-unskilled wage diﬀerential
when skilled workers are mobile and when middle products are traded. More precisely, con-
sider region 1 as a large economy and region 2 as a small economy. Under a more eﬃcient
design in region 1’s ﬁnal good production process, this region experiences more employment
agglomeration, higher capital accumulation and larger output growth. However, by opening
economies to trade via a decrease in trade cost, employment agglomeration declines in re-
gion 1, while its capital accumulation and output growth may be higher. Because both the
interregional distribution of middle products and the mobility of skilled workers generate
negative eﬀects that may oﬀset the conventional positive productivity eﬀects, the opening to
trade need not raise the skill premium in the large economy. This has a major implication in
that the existence of several opposing eﬀects makes it very hard to predict the total impact
between national investment rates and national saving rates (15-year averages) in a cross section of countries.
This empirical regularity would have not been observed, should the degree of international capital mobility
is high. It has been further supported by Bayoumi [5] who use more recent cross-country data. However, the
reader should keep in mind that the Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis has been criticized by many economists,
particularly because of the fact that since early 1970s, the restrictions imposed on international capital
mobility have been declining over time in the world economy (Baxter and Crucini [4]) while the European
Union becomes more integrated. Nevertheless, the bulk of such criticisms only applies to the international
investment fund, rather than to the ﬁxed physical capital stock of the putty-clay type.
4of trade liberalization on wage inequalities. Our analysis may, therefore, be viewed as an
attempt to reconcile various and contrasted results in the literature.
From the methodological point of view, our paper ﬁrst shows that, contrary to general
beliefs, the impact of trade liberalization may diﬀer as to the ﬁnal and intermediate goods
markets. Indeed, whereas lower trade costs in conventional setups generally triggers more
agglomeration of the ﬁnal good sector (Fujita, Krugman and Venables [16]), we will see that
the opposite holds for the middle product market. Second, our modeling strategy diﬀers from
that used by Dixit and Stiglitz [12] and Ethier [13] in a way that will be made clear in section
3.2 below.
Related Literature
Three related papers are Sanyal and Jones [36], Ventura [40] and Ottaviano, Tabuchi and
Thisse [32].6 On the one hand, our assumption of traded intermediate goods in conjunction
with non-traded ﬁnal goods resembles the setups by Sanyal and Jones and by Ventura,
although the structure of our model and the purpose of our study are very diﬀerent. In
particular, whereas Sanyal and Jones develop the ﬁrst theory of trade in two middle products
in a static framework, Ventura focuses primarily on how trade in two intermediate goods
may support permanent growth by preventing an economy from diminishing returns. Our
setting diﬀers from theirs in several respects: (i) we have a large number of intermediate
tradeables provided under imperfect competition, (ii) we allow for two types of labor (mobile
and immobile), thus permitting us to endogenize the interregional/international distribution
of the intermediate sector, and (iii) we deal with the impact of regional agglomeration of this
sector on growth and trade.
On the other, our assumption of variety substitution with non-constant markups resembles
the consumption variety setup in Ottaviano et al. Yet, we consider intermediate goods trade
6There is a vast theoretical literature concerning trade and growth that is remotely related to our paper.
To name but a few, this includes: (i) international specialization models (Stokey [37]; Bond, Trask and
Wang [9]), (ii) product variety models (Grossman and Helpman [17]; Xie [43]), (iii) reverse engineering
models (Rivera-Bartiz and Romer [33]; Wan [41]), and (iv) technology transfer/adoption models (Chen and
Shimomura [11]).
5and capital accumulation, which diﬀer sharply from their framework. An interesting ﬁnding in
their paper is that with ﬁnal goods trade, a strong variety bias and a low transport cost make
regional agglomeration sustainable. With intermediate goods trade, our result concerning
variety bias corroborates with theirs, but that regarding the transport cost contrasts with
their conclusion.
2 The Model
The global economy consists of two regions, indexed by i =1 ,2, and two sectors, the in-
termediate and ﬁnal sectors. The ﬁnal good, produced by multinational or multiregional
enterprises, is homogenous and non-traded. It can be used for consumption and investment.
Further, we assume that, in each region, the ﬁnal sector is competitive. In what follows, we
will show that the ﬁnal good may be chosen as the numéraire in each region. By contrast,
the intermediate sector supplies diﬀerentiated varieties and shipping one unit of any variety
between the two regions requires τ>0 units of the numéraire, whereas intraregional ship-
ping costs are zero. When both regions import nontrivial amount of middle products of some
varieties from each other, the two regions are said to be vertically integrated.
There are two types of labor employed in the ﬁnal sector, the skilled and the unskilled
workers. The skilled are mobile and can move instantaneously at zero cost from one region
to the other; by contrast, the unskilled are immobile. The mass of unskilled available in each
region is normalized to 1. The total mass of skilled is given and denoted by L.
There are three theaters of activities in our model: (i) the intermediate goods production,
(ii) the ﬁnal good production and (iii) the intertemporal consumption choice. We describe
each one in order.
2.1 The intermediate sector
Let Ni denotes the mass of intermediate goods produced in region i. For notational con-
venience, we rank the intermediate goods in such a way that variety v ∈ D1 ≡ [0,N 1] is
6produced in region 1,w h e r e a sv a r i e t yv ∈ D2 ≡ [N1,N] is produced in region 2.7
Even though the production of intermediate goods is decentralized, skilled workers are
hired by the ﬁnal sector to design the intermediate product line. T h i si sd o n eb ya s s u m i n g





λiLi =1 ,2 (1)
where λi ∈ [0,1] is the endogenous share of skilled labor in region i (λ1 + λ2 =1 ). In
particular, for the same mass of skilled workers, a decrease in φ amounts to increasing the
number of varieties. Furthermore, each variety is supplied by a single ﬁrm. Accordingly, the
intermediate sector involves a continuum N of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms with
N = N1 + N2 (2)
Firms operating in the intermediate sector follow a mill pricing policy. This amounts to
saying that the delivered price of variety v produced in region i and transported to region j
(pij(v))i sd e ﬁned by the sum of its mill price pi(v) and interregional transport cost. We thus
have:
pii(v)=pi(v) and pij(v)=pi(v)+τ (j 6= i).( 3 )
We also assume that each unit of variety v requires η>0 units of the numéraire. Let x(v,t)
be the output of ﬁrm v at time t. The proﬁto ft h i sﬁrm, located in region i when v ∈ Di,a t
time t is therefore
πi(v,t)=m a x
x(v)
[pi(v,t) − r(t)η]x(v,t) (4)











7In each region, any single variety is inessential as it has zero measure in our continuum setup. Accordingly,
we can always re-order the varieties as described in the foregoing.
7We now describe how the demand of a variety is split between the two regions. Let δi(v)
be the endogenous fraction of the quantity of variety v ∈ Di used to produce the ﬁnal good in
region i. The basic structure of the middle product economy is delineated in Figure 1. The
endogenous allocation of intermediate goods (varieties) may then be summarized as follows:
Variety
Region
v ∈ D1 v ∈ D2 Variety Demand
1 δ1(v)x(v) (1 − δ2(v))x(v) xd
1(v)
2 (1 − δ1(v))x(v) δ2(v)x(v) xd
2(v)
Variety Supply x(v) x(v)







δ1(v)x(v) if v ∈ D1








(1 − δ1(v))x(v) if v ∈ D1
δ2(v)x(v) if v ∈ D2







i =1 ,2 (7)
we follow Romer [34] and interpret the total quantity Ki of the numéraire used in region i
for producing all the varieties of this region as its capital good. The capital good is rented
from consumers at the market gross rental rate r.
2.2 The ﬁnal sector
Firms producing the ﬁnal good are identical and perfectly competitive. The total mass of
ﬁr m si so n ea n dﬁrms are represented by an index that is uniformly distributed over the unit
8interval. Because their output cannot be traded, it is optimal for each ﬁr mb e l o n g i n gt ot h e
ﬁnal sector to operate two plants, one in each region. In other words, a ﬁnal good ﬁrm can
be regarded as a multinational or multiregional enterprise.
Because our main focus is on the skilled workers, we will use a framework in which
unskilled workers are passive. Formally, this means that we assume that the production





Yi if one unit of unskilled labor is used
0 otherwise

















































The parameters in (8) are such that α>0 and β>γ . In this expression, α expresses the
intensity of production for the intermediate goods, whereas β>γmeans that the level of
production is higher when the production process is more sophisticated. Accordingly, we will
refer to β − γ>0 as the variety bias in the production process. For a given value of β,
the parameter γ>(resp., <)0implies that intermediate good inputs are Pareto substitutes
(resp., complements).
Note that our technology is such that each ﬁrm in the ﬁnal sector uses a ﬁxed requirement
of unskilled labor, regardless of the size of the range of intermediate goods. As a result, the
wage level of the unskilled is generally undetermined. Since unskilled workers are not mobile,
their market wages may be diﬀerent. Nonetheless, the ﬁnal good, even though it is non-
traded, can still be chosen as the numéraire in each region by adjusting the wages of the
unskilled labor such that the Law of One Price applies to the ﬁnal good. As there is only one
ﬁnal good, this normalization is inconsequential to our analysis of the eﬀect of a reduction
in trade barriers on the skilled-unskilled wage gap (see (29) below).
Because ﬁrms are identical and represented by an index uniformly distributed over the
unit interval, there is no need to diﬀerentiate between the individual and aggregate output.




































































so that the aggregate output of the ﬁnal sector is Y = Y1 + Y2. Thus, our setting allows for
the substitution between capital and skilled labor within and between regions, via the use
of an endogenous number of intermediate goods. However, there is no substitution between
skilled labor and capital, on the one hand, and unskilled labor, on the other.
The ﬁnal sector ﬁrms optimize over the two regions. Proﬁts earned in regions 1 and 2 are
given, respectively, by







(p2(w)+τ)(1 − δ2(w))x(w)dw − WU1 − WSλ1L
and







p2(w)δ2(w)x(w)dw − WU2 − WSλ2L.
where WUi denotes the wage rate of the unskilled workers in region i and WS the common
10wage rate of the skilled workers. Hence, the global proﬁts of the ﬁnal sector are:








[p2(v)+τ(1 − δ2(v))]x(v)dv − 2WU − WSL.
where WU = 1
2
P2
i=1 WUi is the average market wage for the unskilled. The ﬂow value in
time t of the ﬁnal sector is therefore given by
υ(t)= m a x
{x(i),δ1(i),δ2(i)}
P[x(i),δ1(i),δ2(i)] (9)









dµ.( 1 0 )
2.3 Consumers
The total mass of consumers residing in region i is given by
Mi =1+λiL =1+φNi.( 1 1 )












.( 1 2 )
Denoting the capital depreciation rate by di and the amount of ﬁn a lg o o di nr e g i o ni used
for consumption by Zi, the dynamics of regional capital accumulation is thus governed by
the equation of motion:
•
Ki(t)=Yi(t) − Zi(t) − diKi −
Z
Di
[(1 − r)η + τ(1 − δi(v))]x(v)dv (13)
where the time index t will be suppressed whenever it does not generate any confusion. In
(13), the last term may be explained as follows. First, −
R
Di(1 − r)ηx(v)dv > 0 measures
11the rental revenue from capital. Second, as the transport rate is expressed in terms of the
numéraire, the term τ(1−δi(v))x(v) > 0 stands for the transport costs of variety v exported
from region i.8 In order to avoid double counting, the transport costs of region i’s imports
do not appear in (13).
Because the main focus of the paper is on the agglomeration of skilled workers, we consider
t h es i m p l ec a s ei nw h i c hall consumers (regardless of their diﬀerences in skill) equally share
the capital of the region in which they reside. As a consequence, we can denote each worker’s











Dividing throughout by the correspondent population, one can rewrite (13) to obtain
•





[(1 − r)η + τ(1 − δi(v))]x(v)dv.( 1 4 )
In this setup, any consumer living in region i chooses the consumption plan {zi(t)} that
maximizes her lifetime utility Ui subject to the capital accumulation equation (14).
As in the endogenous or neoclassical growth literature, we assume that the lifetime utility
is time separable with a constant time preference rate (ρ>0) and the instantaneous utility
function exhibits constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ>0). Under perfect
foresights, a constant parameter proﬁle and the assumption that no one would move without
a strictly positive valuation gain, the outcome of the optimization problem must have a time-
invariant location solution. That is, if a skilled worker optimally chooses a particular location
at time 0, it is always optimal for her to stay at that location thereafter. Since our focus is
on characterizing the long-run equilibrium, we may then assume without loss of generality
that skilled workers determine their residential location at the beginning of their lifetime

















1 − σ−1 e
−ρtdt s.t. (14) (15)
In other words, at time 0 each skilled worker chooses a region where to reside and work;
she then receives the current returns from the capital invested in the corresponding region.9
The skilled worker’s problem may thus be solved in two stages where the standard backward
solving technique applies (i.e., second stage solved ﬁrst). In the second stage, given the
locational choice, the Maximum Principle applies to the intertemporal optimization problem.
In the ﬁrst stage, by comparing the values of U0
1 and U0
2, the skilled worker determines the
residential location that yields the higher valuation at time 0. Hence, the assumption of
mobility of the skilled workers allows us to determine the way in which the intermediate
sector is distributed between the two regions. By contrast, the optimization problem of
unskilled workers (who are immobile) involves the second stage only.
3 The Equilibrium
We begin by solving each agent’s optimization problem by imposing ex post symmetry. We
then study the properties of the steady-state equilibrium.
3.1 The ﬁnal sector
Using the expressions for Y1 and Y2,w ec a nd i ﬀerentiate Y with respect to x(v) for v ∈ Di
(i =1 ,2) to obtain:
dY
dx(v)




where γ in the last term in (16) reﬂects the degree of intraregional substitution among varieties
locally available, whereas, because of interregional transport cost, the degree of interregional
9In the absence of a perpetually growing force, the lifetime utility must always be bounded under the
forgoning speciﬁcation.
13substitution is captured by γ multiplied by the following two terms:
∆i(v) ≡ (δi(v))
2 +( 1− δi(v))
2
Ψi(v,w) ≡ [(1 − δi(w)) + δi(v)(2δi(w) − 1)]/∆i(w)
(note that Ψi(v,v)=1 ). This in turn can be used with (9) to derive a ﬁnal producer’s
ﬁrst-order condition with respect to x(v) (i.e., dυ(t)/dx(v)=0 ) as follows:
α − (β − γ)∆i(v)x(v) − γ
Z
Di
Ψi(v,w)∆i(w)x(w)dw = e pi(v) (17)
where, for v ∈ Di,
e pi(v) ≡ [Γ(i)p1(v)+( 1− Γ(i))p2(v)] + τ {1 − [Γ(i)δ1(v)+( 1− Γ(i))δ2(v)]} (18)
may be interpreted as the average trading price of variety v ∈ Di,g i v e nt h a tΓ(v)=1for
v ∈ D1 and Γ(v)=0for v ∈ D2.T h i s p r i c e r e ﬂects the fact that variety v, produced in
region i, is bought in both regions at the same mill price, a fact that ties together the two
regional markets.10

















Ψi(v,w)[∆i(w)x(w) − ∆i(v)x(v)]dw. (20)
Hence, the diﬀerence between the demands for any two particular varieties produced in region
i a n dw e i g h t e db y∆i is a linear function of the corresponding price diﬀerence. We will see
that this property will enable us to solve analytically for the equilibrium price and quantity
of each variety.
10An alternative setting is to assume segmented markets in which ﬁrms choose one price for each regional
market. The current framework, however, ﬁts better the literature on trade and vertical integration.
14Combining (19) and (20), we get
e pi(v)=α −
∙











Ψi(v,w)[e pi(w) − e pi(v)]dw (21)
which yields the demand function for variety v ∈ Di ( i =1 ,2):
x(v)=ai(v) − bi(v)e pi(v)+ci(v)
Z
Di
Ψi(v,w)[e pi(w) − e pi(v)]dw (22)










as well as ai(v) ≡ αbi(v) and ci(v) ≡ [γ/(β − γ)]bi(v). In (22), the last term stands for the
competition eﬀect:w h e nﬁrm v charges a price higher (resp., lower) than competitors, the
term will be negative (resp., positive), thus shifting down (resp., up) the demand curve for
variety v.











Hence, the ﬁrst-order condition for (9) with respect to δi(v) becomes:
(β − γ)[2δi(v) − 1]x(v)+γ
Z
Di
[2δi(w) − 1]x(w)dw = τx(v).( 2 4 )
Equations (22) and (24) jointly determine the total demand for variety v (x(v))a sw e l la s
its allocation between the two regions (δi(v))a sf u n c t i o n so fi t sa v e r a g et r a d i n gp r i c e( e pi(v))
and the range of varieties (Di) produced in the same region.
As in standard theory on product diﬀerentiation, we consider the case of symmetry. In
this case, (24) can be simpliﬁed as follows:










β + γ (Ni − 1)
¸
≡ δi(Ni).( 2 5 )
15Thus, we have:
Proposition 1 (Intermediate Good Allocation) The lower the interregional transport cost
and/or the higher the variety bias is, the more each region is vertically integrated. Fur-
thermore, when varieties are substitutes (resp., complements), the larger the mass of local
varieties, the more (resp., less) each region is vertically integrated.
In words, a smaller proportion of the local varieties used by the ﬁnal producers established
in the corresponding region implies more vertical integration and a lower degree of regional
agglomeration of skilled workers. In particular, in the extreme case in which δ
∗
i =1 /2,t h e
two regions are completely integrated; in the other extreme case in which δ
∗
i =1 , all skilled
workers are agglomerated in region i.
The share of an intermediate good used by the ﬁnal sector in the region in which it is
produced increases with the interregional transport cost because the foreign varieties are less
attractive. This contrasts with Ottaviano et al. [32] in which lower transport costs of ﬁnal
goods between regions make regional agglomeration sustainable, thus showing that results
holding for the ﬁnal good trade model do not necessarily carry over to the middle product
economy.
Furthermore, the share of an intermediate good used by the ﬁnal sector decreases (resp.,
increases) with the endogenous number of local substitutable (resp., complementary) varieties
because ﬁnal sector ﬁr m sc a r em o r e( r e s p . ,l e s s )a b o u tﬁnding local opportunities. The main
message is the positive relationship between the mass of local varieties (Ni)a n dt h ee x t e n t
of vertical integration, as captured by 1 − δ
∗
i.
We now turn to the level of demand of variety v.W h e n v,w ∈ Di,t h es y m m e t r y






[β + γ (Ni − 1)][δ
2
i +( 1− δi)
2]
ª−1
≡ bi, so that the average trading
price becomes:
e pi(v)=pi + τ(1 − δi) (26)
which is given by the sum of the mill price and the export-adjusted unit transport cost. Using
16(26), we can then derive the demand for variety v under symmetry as:
xi =
α − pi − τ(1 − δi)
[β + γ (Ni − 1)][δ
2
i +( 1− δi)
2]
(27)
or, xi = ai − bi [pi + τ(1 − δi)], which is decreasing in its own price, in the unit transport
cost, and, for a given value of δi, in the mass of local varieties. The eﬀect of δi on variety v’s
demand is, however, ambiguous:
∂xi
∂δi




That is, when the demand level of a particular intermediate good is low, retaining a larger
share of this variety for the local ﬁnal producers raises its demand. Substituting (25) into
(27) leads to:
xi =
[β + γ (Ni − 1)][2(α − pi) − τ]+τ2
[β + γ (Ni − 1)]
2 + τ2 .( 2 8 )





2τ (1 − δi)
2 +( 2 δi − 1)
2 [2(α − pi) − τ]
ª
©




Thus, the economy-wide demand for an intermediate good produced in region i (xi)i su n -
ambiguously decreasing in the unit transport cost (τ), because from (18) the gross price
(inclusive of the transport cost) is higher. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 2 (Intermediate Good Demand) The demand of any variety decreases in the
interregional transport cost; it increases (resp., decreases) with its share in the intermediate
good consumption by local plants when its input is smaller (resp., larger) than 1/2.
In equilibrium, the wages of the skilled in the two regions must be equal because the
skilled are mobile and because the ﬁnal good is the numéraire in each region. In addition,
free entry and exit in the intermediate sector makes the skilled workers the residual claimers,
thus implying that proﬁts are zero in the ﬁnal sector. Consequently, it follows from (9) that,








Nie pixi − 2WU
)
(29)
17Hence, once the wage of the unskilled is set by the market, the wage of the skilled is adjusted
i naw a ys u c ht h a tt h ee n t i r ep r o ﬁtm a d eb yt h eﬁnal good producers is absorb by these
workers.11 Observe that the relationship between WS and the wages of the unskilled workers
is linear, thus conﬁrming that our normalization rules have no impact on the wage gap.
3.2 The intermediate sector




which can be used with (4) to derive intermediate good producers’ ﬁrst-order conditions
(v ∈ Di, i =1 ,2):
dπi(v)
dx(v)
= pi(v) − rη + x(v)
dpi(v)
dx(v)
= pi(v) − rη − β∆i(v)x(v)=0 .( 3 0 )




.( 3 1 )





i +( 1− δi)
2]
≡ xi(Ni,p i) (32)
or, more intuitively,
xi = bi [β + γ (Ni − 1)](pi − rη)/β
w h i c hi si n c r e a s i n gi ni t so w np r i c epi for any given value of δi.S i n c eδi is decreasing in Ni
and xi is decreasing in δi,i ti sc l e a rt h a txi is increasing in Ni.T h u s ,w eh a v e :
Proposition 3 (Intermediate Good Supply) The higher the common price of local varieties
is, the larger the supply of each of them is. Furthermore, when varieties are substitutes
11We may allow for the existence of a ﬁxed setup cost V0 > 0 to absorb normal proﬁts. In this case, the
zero proﬁt condition must be modiﬁed to have the term (r − 1)V0 substracted from the righthand side.
18(resp., complements), the greater the number of local varieties is, the larger (resp., smaller)
the supply of each of them is.
Observe that, in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier model, the elasticity of substitution and the
mark-up are constant. This implies that a larger number of local varieties leads to a lower
quantity provided by each intermediate ﬁrm. By contrast, in our setting where the mark-up
is variable, the relationship between the number of local varieties and its consumption by
the ﬁnal sector depends on whether varieties are substitutes or complements. When they are
substitutes, Proposition 3 tells us that a larger number of local varieties leads to a higher
quantity provided by each intermediate ﬁrm.
Moreover, combining (27) and (32) enables us to solve for the common equilibrium price




rη[β + γ (Ni − 1)] + β [α − τ (1 − δi)]
2β + γ (Ni − 1)
.( 3 3 )





i + τ(1 − δi)=
αβ +[ β + γ (Ni − 1)][rη + τ (1 − δi)]
2β + γ (Ni − 1)
.( 3 4 )
Hence, the equilibrium mill price (p∗
i) decreases with transport, cost whereas the average
trading price (e p∗
i), which accounts for the trade pattern, increases.




rητ + β(2δi(Ni) − 1)[α − τ(1 − δi(Ni))]
τ + β(2δi(Ni) − 1)
≡ pi(Ni).( 3 5 )
This shows that an increase in the mass of intermediate goods reduces the demand of each
variety, hence its monopoly power, thus leading the corresponding ﬁrm to lower its price.
However, because intermediate ﬁrms incur a cost associated with its spending on capital
(rη), they cannot aﬀord to charge very low prices. The assumption below is imposed for
these ﬁrms’ proﬁts to be positive.
Assumption 1: α + τ/2 >r η .
19Proposition 4 (Intermediate Goods Prices) Under Assumption 1, the larger the mass of
local varieties is, the lower the equilibrium mill price of these varieties is. Furthermore, for
any given allocation of varieties, lower transport costs lead to higher equilibrium mill prices
but lower average trading prices.




(2δi(Ni) − 1)[α − τ(1 − δi(Ni)) − rη]
[δ
2
i +( 1− δi)
2][τ + β(2δi(Ni) − 1)]
≡ xi(Ni).( 3 6 )
By increasing the mass of local varieties, we induce a negative price eﬀect for each interme-
diate producer, whereas the interregional redistribution givesr i s et oap o s i t i v ee ﬀect. Thus,
the net eﬀect of changing the mass of local varieties on the equilibrium quantity of middle
products is generally ambiguous. The equilibrium of the middle product market is depicted
in Figure 2. As one can see, due to the ambiguity in demand shifts in response to a high mass
of local varieties, the equilibrium quantity of each middle product may rise or fall, though
its equilibrium average trading price must be lower.
3.3 Capital accumulation and locational choice
By symmetry and using (11), we can rewrite the capital evolution equation as follows:
•
ki = yi − zi − (mi + di)ki −
Ni
1+φNi
{(1 − r)η + τ[1 − δi(Ni)]}xi(Ni) (37)





1 − σ−1 + ξi{yi − zi − (mi + di)ki −
Ni
1+φNi
[(1 − r)η + τ(1 − δi)]xi}




i = ξi. (38)








− (mi + di)
¸
(39)
















− (ρ + mi + di)
¸
(40)
Note that there is no ﬁnal good trade and the production of region i’s intermediate goods
only requires the ﬁnal good as given by (7). Therefore, in making capital investment decision,
region i’s consumers must take the intermediate goods produced in the other region j 6= i
as given. Using (7), (11), the deﬁnition of Yi as well as yi ≡ Yi/Mi,w eo b t a i nr e g i o ni’s per


































In what follows, we assume that the variety bias in the production process is suﬃciently
l a r g ef o rt h el e m m ab e l o wt ob ee s t a b l i s h e d .
Assumption 2: β − γ>φ γ N 2.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, N>0 and k>0 exist such that for all Ni ∈ (0,N)























− (ρ + mi + di)
¸
(43)
21where, for any given value of Ni, (43) says that the rate of growth of ﬁnal good consumption
(θi) depends only upon the value of ki. Combining (37) and (41), the rate of growth of
capital (ki) depends on both zi and ki,f o rag i v e nv a l u eo fNi and a given consumption
δi(Ni) of intermediate goods supplied by the foreign region. Thus, for consumers residing




ki/ki) jointly solve the
dynamic paths of consumption and capital.
Upon solving for these optimizing paths and applying (1) and (25), each consumer’s
lifetime utility can be expressed as a function of Ni: U0
i = U0
i (Ni). In equilibrium, skilled





2(N − N1) (44)
where the population identity (2) has been used and U0
i is deﬁned as in (15). This equilibrium
condition determines the interregional distribution of skilled workers.
Deﬁnition 1 A dynamic market equilibrium (DME) is a collection of quantity paths
{zi,k i,y i,x i,δ i,N i,M i} a n dac o l l e c t i o no fp r i c ep a t h s{pi,W S} (i =1 ,2)s u c ht h a t :
(i) each consumer maximizes her lifetime utility subject to the capital evolution equation,
i.e., (37) and (43) are met;
(ii) each ﬁnal good producer and each intermediate producer maximize its proﬁtu n d e rt h e
speciﬁed production technologies, i.e., (25) and (36) are met;
(iii) the zero-proﬁt condition for the ﬁnal good market prevails, i.e., (29) is met;
(iv) both the intermediate goods and the ﬁnal good markets clear, i.e., (35) and (41) are
met;
(v) the spatial equilibrium condition (44) and the population identities, (2) and (11), are
met.
T h eW a l r a sl a wi m p l i e st h a tt h ez e r o - p r o ﬁt condition for each intermediate good ﬁrm is
satisﬁed.
224 The Steady-State Equilibrium
In this section, we focus on the steady-state equilibrium of the dynamic economy described
in the foregoing.
Deﬁnition 2 A steady-state equilibrium (SSE) is a dynamic market equilibrium {zi,k i,
yi,x i,δ i,N i,M i,P i,W S} such that, for i =1 ,2, all quantities have zero growth and skilled
workers do not move (mi =0 ).
Because the production function in the ﬁnal sector is strictly concave, output growth must
asymptotically come to an end. Hence, in our paper, economic growth and population agglom-
eration both refer to the transitional output growth process (yi), as in neoclassical growth
theory, and the transitional agglomeration process (Ni). Speciﬁcally, economic growth trig-
gers a higher level of output per capita in the steady state, whereas agglomeration implies
growing clustering of skilled workers in region i.
























zi(Ni)=yi(N1,N 2,k i) − diki −
Ni {(1 − r)η + τ[1 − δi(Ni)]}xi(Ni)
1+φNi
(46)
By diﬀerentiating (45) with respect to Ni, we obtain after some straightforward, but
tedious, calculations:
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, there exists an e N>0 such that for all Ni ∈ (0, e N),
∂ki
∂Ni > 0
and for all Ni ∈ ( e N,N),
∂ki
∂Ni < 0.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we further establish:
23Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists an b N>0 such that for all Ni ∈ (0, b N),
∂zi
∂Ni > 0 and for all Ni ∈ ( b N,N),
∂zi
∂Ni < 0.








Thus, because the migration of skilled workers is costless, the spatial equilibrium condition
(44) together with (47) implies the following equilibrium condition:
z1(N1)=z2(N2) (48)
Equations (2), (45), (46) and (48) jointly determine the steady-state equilibrium values of
{zi,k i,N i}.
By locational symmetry, we focus only upon the steady-state equilibrium outcomes in
region 1. Moreover, we consider primarily a benchmark case satisfying a stronger version of
dynamic eﬃciency in the sense that not only consumption, output and capital are positively
related, but these magnitudes are also positively related to the number of local varieties.
Speciﬁcally, we restrict ourselves to the ranges ki ∈ (0,k) and 0 <N 1 < min{N, e N, b N}.
I nt h i sc a s e ,w ec a nu s eF i g u r e3t od e t e r m i n eg r a p h i c a l l yt h es t e a d y - s t a t ee q u i l i b r i u m .T o
begin with, we plot region 1’s consumption function z1(N1) a c c o r d i n gt o( 4 6 )i nt h eu p p e r
right panel and region 2’s consumption function z2(N2) in the upper left panel. The lower
left panel is a 45◦ auxiliary line, whereas the lower right panel gives the population identity
(2). Combining the relationships in the upper left, lower left and lower right panels, we
obtain the z2(N1) locus. The intersection of the z1(N1) and z2(N1) loci gives the steady-state
equilibrium value of (N∗
1,z∗
1), under which (48) is satisﬁed. Obviously, our benchmark solution
is the dynamically eﬃcient outcome represented by point E (while point A is dynamically
ineﬃcient). In Figure 4, we then use the ﬁnal upper right panel together with (41) and the
k1(N1) relationship in (45) to determine the steady-state equilibrium values of (y∗
1,k∗
1).
Let us ﬁrst examine the consequences of an increase in the unit transport cost (τ). We
impose the following suﬃcient condition to ensure that the direct eﬀect of transport cost
24dominates the indirect disincentive eﬀect through interregional intermediate good reallocation





Assumption 3: β − γ>1+τ.
For a given N1, we see from (46) that Assumption 3 is suﬃcient to guarantee both z1 and z2
to decrease if the import eﬀect through 1−δ2 is suﬃciently small. Hence, both the z1(N1) and
z2(N1) l o c i( a sw e l la st h ey1(N1) and k1(N1) loci) in Figure 4 shift towards the horizontal axis,
so that the net eﬀect on N∗
1 becomes ambiguous. However, if region 1 is a “large economy”
and region 2 is a “small economy” in the sense that the import eﬀect is small in region 1
but large in region 2, then the downward shift in the z1(N1) locus is greater than that in the
z2(N1) locus in magnitude. As a consequence, the range of varieties produced in region 1 in
the steady-state equilibrium (N∗
1) rises and there is employment agglomeration in the large
economy (i.e., region 1), because the interregional transactions become more costly. Yet, as
both y1(N1) and k1(N1) loci also shift towards the horizontal axis, capital accumulation and
output growth in region 1 need not increase.
Because ki and zi depend only upon the size of the skilled population in region i (see
(45) and (46)), we can study the eﬀects of a more eﬃcient design of the production process
that occurs only in region 1 (i.e., φ in region 1 decreases). In this case, the z1(N1) locus
shifts downwards, the y1(N1) and k1(N1) loci shift upwards, while the z2(N1) locus remains
unchanged. The steady-state equilibrium N∗
1 is unambiguously higher, as are y∗
1 and k∗
1.
That is, a more eﬃcient design of the production process that occurs only in region 1 leads
to employment agglomeration together with greater capital accumulation and higher regional
output growth.12
In summary, we have:
12By examining (45) and (46), we can easily see that given identical preferences across regions, consumers’
preference parameters (ρ and σ)h a v en oe ﬀect on equilibrium agglomeration outcomes.
25Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics) Under Assumptions 1-3, the steady-state equilibrium
possesses the following properties:
(i) when region 1 is a large economy and region 2 is a small economy, a decrease in the
interregional transport cost induces skilled labor mobility, promotes vertical integration,
and discourages employment agglomeration in the large economy, but has ambiguous
eﬀect on capital accumulation and regional output growth;
(ii) am o r ee ﬃcient design of the ﬁnal good production process that occurs only in region 1
results in higher employment agglomeration, capital accumulation and regional output
growth.
An important message is that employment agglomeration and output growth need not
be positively related in response to changes in the underlying economic parameters,t h e r e b y
lending theoretical support to empirical observations (see Berliant and Wang [7] and papers
cited therein).
Another interesting ﬁnding of our analysis is that trade need not be associated with a
widened skilled-unskilled wage gap. Indeed, examining (29) reveals that several eﬀects are
at work in our setting. Trade liberalization can be viewed as a reduction in τ,w h i c hi n
turn has diﬀerentiated impacts on the determinants of the wage gap, or the skill premium,
as measured by WS − WU. First, as seen in Proposition 1, a decrease in τ leads to more
vertical integration between the two regions. However, Proposition 2 tells us that the ﬁnal
sector uses less of each variety as more varieties are made available through the opening to
trade. In addition, Proposition 4 says that the mill price charged by ﬁrms goes up when
transport costs decrease, whereas the corresponding average trading price decreases. Finally,
we know from Proposition 5 that, when τ decreases, the number of varieties produced in
the large region decreases but the impact on the ﬁnal sector output is ambiguous. To sum-
up, the decrease of δ1 and N1 narrows the wage gap (assuming that N1 aﬀects net proﬁt
positively), whereas the decrease of x1 and e p1 all widen the wage gap. These opposite eﬀects,
26together with the ambiguity of the output eﬀect makes it very diﬃcult to predict the total
eﬀect of trade liberalization on wage inequalities, which provides a plausible way to reconcile
the heated debates in the literature. More intuitively, a reduction of trade costs leads to
two major negative eﬀects on the skill premium, via the interregional distribution of middle
products (captured by δ1) and the mobility of skilled workers (captured by N1); the associated
positive eﬀects are due to enhanced skill labor productivity and reduced scale economies for
each variety. Summarizing,
Proposition 6 (Wage Inequality) Under Assumptions 1-3, a decrease in the trade cost does
not widen the skill premium when the interregional middle-product redistribution eﬀect, the
skilled-worker mobility eﬀect, or both, are suﬃciently large.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have developed a two-region dynamic general equilibrium model with mobile and immo-
bile workers and monopolistically competitive intermediate goods ﬁrms to examine economic
integration and development in the process of globalization. We ﬁnd that (i) employment
agglomeration and output growth need not be positively related, (ii) trade is not necessarily
beneﬁcial to regional growth, and (iii) trade between the two regions need not be associated
with a widened skilled-unskilled wage gap. These results may explain why it is so hard to
reach a consensus in empirical studies devoted to the impact of trade.
Several extensions are worth studying. First, in a more complete analysis, the ﬁnal good
should be considered as being tradable. Second, mobile and immobile workers could also be
distinguished by having diﬀerent capital shares and preferences. Third, as our setting exhibits
monopolistic competition and pecuniary agglomeration externalities, it could be used to ﬁgure
out how interregional transfer, tax and investment subsidy policies can alleviate the resulting
social ineﬃciency. Last, our model could be used to reexamine the issue of optimal tariﬀ in
a vertically integrated world economy.
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